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One way to understand how Aristotle thinks about matter is to 
look closely at his Physics (On Nature) 1 and 2, where he describes 
matter at a high level of generality. This can help us understand his 
reasons for identifying matter as one of the principles and causes needed 
to do natural science. However, it does not provide much insight into 
what concrete role matter is supposed to play in our understanding of 
the natural world. Moreover, his account in the Physics leaves several 
important questions open, which can be answered by looking closely at 
how he uses matter in his scientific explanations. Aristotle’s scientific 
corpus is large and in places melds seamlessly with what we would con-
sider philosophical works. While we typically distinguish science from 
philosophy, Aristotle himself considered his scientific works to be part 
of natural philosophy.1 Natural philosophy comprises slightly over nine 
hundred pages in the Complete Works of Aristotle: the Revised Oxford 
Translation. Of this, more than four hundred pages are detailed biology. 
Aristotle was the first systematic biologist and his biology contains his 
most impressive scientific work.2 But, for Aristotle, it is important to 
understand the entirety of the natural world, from the elements to the 
cosmos as a whole. His scientific concepts are meant to apply gener-
ally to all natural things. For this reason, among others, it is illumin-
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One of Aristotle’s major contributions to natural science was his devel- 
opment of an idea that he called ‘hulê’, which we translate into 
English as ‘matter’. The notion of matter seems quite ordinary to us 
today, but Aristotle’s idea was new at the time. The word hulê’ 
originally meant forest, brushwood, or cut wood and, aside from a 
single occurrence in Plato’s Philebus (54c), Aristotle is the ￿rst 
(extant) author to use the term in a general account of things in the 
natural world. Our notion of matter is a descendant of his, but we 




what follows I first consider menstrual fluid as the matter of animal 
reproduction in the Generation of Animals, then the more puzzling 
case of the body of a living thing as its matter in the De anima (On the 
Soul), and finally the notoriously obscure matter for the transformation 
of the elements in Generation and Corruption.3 I focus on two thorny 
questions about matter that arise in these works.
One question is how to reconcile two apparently incompatible 
ways that Aristotle discusses matter. Sometimes he treats matter 
as relative to some particular type of change. Thus, in the Parts of 
Animals he says that blood is matter of the body since it nourishes it 
(651a12– 15, 668a1– 4) and in Generation and Corruption he refers to 
the ‘matter of size’, which is the matter involved in growth (320b22– 
25, 321a6– 7).4 Menstrual fluid as the matter for animal generation is an 
example of this sort of matter that is relative to a change. According 
to this way of treating matter, there are different types of matter for 
different types of change. However, at other times Aristotle says that 
substances (paradigmatically, living things like trees, dogs, and spiders) 
are composed of form and matter, not a bundle of forms and a bundle of 
matters. This latter way of thinking about matter does not seem rela-
tive to a particular change in the way that the former is. Does Aristotle 
have a coherent notion of matter that fits with these two ways he 
identifies it?
The other question is how to understand the matter involved in 
the transmutation of the elements. Aristotle thinks that fire, earth, air, 
and water are the simplest bodies and that they can transform into one 
another. He is clear that there is a matter for the transformation of these 
elements, but his discussion of this is obscure. There is a medieval trad-
ition that takes this matter to be actually nothing, but a pure poten-
tiality to become anything. This matter is typically taken to remain 
through every change, not only the transformation of the elements. 
This traditional view, often referred to as ‘prime matter’, came under 
attack in the middle of the twentieth century, and was the subject of an 
intense debate.5 Part of what gave the debate its particular fervor is that 
it was connected with the question of whether or not Aristotle thinks 
that matter must remain through every change.
In what follows, I  argue that we can reconcile the two appar-
ently incompatible ways that Aristotle describes matter, and in doing 
so develop a new account of the matter of the elements. There is a 
single, coherent notion of matter found in all three treatises, and at 









Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316136096.005
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. HU Humboldt Universitat Zu Berlin, on 04 Feb 2020 at 15:52:03, subject to the Cambridge
Aristotle: the Matter for Birth, Life, the Elements 81
81
sorts of changes under consideration, and (2)  whether Aristotle is 
considering the matter for a specific change, or the matter for all of a 
substance’s characteristic changes.6 Aristotle’s single coherent notion is 
this: matter changes insofar as it is matter.7 It changes not in the active 
sense of changing something else, but in the passive sense of being 
itself changed. In saying that matter does this ‘insofar as it is matter’, 
Aristotle is saying that it does this because it is matter, not because of 
some other feature that it happens to have. Thus, the matter in a change 
is the thing that is properly suited to undergo that change. Just as an 
efficient cause, insofar as it is an efficient cause, changes something 
else, so matter, insofar as it is matter, is changed.
If we want to understand why something is matter in a given 
change, we cannot answer this generically; we need to look at the 
change in question. In the case of making a statue, the sculptor needs 
something that can retain fine levels of detail and hold its shape. Water 
would not work, but bronze does. Note that there are no generic effi-
cient causes; instead, there are sculptors, doctors, and – in Aristotle’s 
view – male sperma in the case of animal reproduction. Similarly, there 
is no generic matter; instead, there are bronze, bodies, and in Aristotle’s 
view, menstrual fluid. Menstrual fluid, according to Aristotle, is what 
is properly suited to become a newborn animal. When acted on by the 
sperma, it becomes the appropriate type of animal insofar as it is men-
strual fluid, not because of some other feature it happens to have. In the 
De anima, the body is what is properly suited to undergo the various 
changes characteristic of a given living creature. So, for example, a 
robin’s wings allow it to engage in a characteristic activity, flying. Many 
of the features that Aristotle ascribes to the matter of the elements in 
Generation and Corruption do not result from general commitments he 
has about all matter, as is generally assumed, but rather from the spe-
cific type of change that he is considering. Aristotle’s views of the elem-
ents and how they change into one another entail that the sort of thing 
suited to become air is the same as the sort suited to become earth, 
water, or fire; this is why it turns out that there is the same matter for 
all four elements.
Generation of Animals
The Generation of Animals is one of Aristotle’s explanatory scientific 
treatises, that is, it seeks to determine the answers to ‘why?’ questions 
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Animals sets out empirical facts about animals in such a way as to 
make salient what explanatory relations could obtain between these 
facts.8 By contrast, treatises such as the Generation of Animals, Parts of 
Animals, and Movement of Animals seek to determine the explanations 
for empirical facts. In particular, the Generation of Animals seeks to 
explain such things as why animals and some plants reproduce sexually 
and why animals resemble their parents.
Aristotle argues in the Generation of Animals that menstrual 
fluid is the matter in animal reproduction. In reproduction the men-
strual fluid is the patient (in the sense of what is passive) and the male’s 
sperma is the agent (what is active). On a traditional understanding of 
matter in Aristotle, it is crucial that it remain through a change. This 
causes a prima facie problem, since the menstrual fluid does not remain 
through the generation of an animal.9 There is no menstrual fluid in the 
newborn animal. The solution, I suggest, is that while Aristotle some-
times describes matter as remaining, that is not essential to his notion 
of matter. Just as the agent of a change may remain through the change, 
but this is not what makes something the agent, so the matter may 
remain through the change, but this is not what makes it the matter. 
Although this is controversial, I would argue that it fits naturally with 
Aristotle’s account of matter in Physics I  and II and Generation and 
Corruption I.10 Aristotle says in Physics 1.7 and 1.9 that things come 
to be from matter not by virtue of concurrence (mê kata sumbebêkos) 
(190b23– 30, 192a31– 32). Just as a doctor heals because she is a doctor, 
not because she happens to be a lyre player, so things come to be from 
matter because it is matter, not because it concurs with something else. 
Aristotle says in Generation and Corruption 1.7 that matter insofar as 
it is matter is passive (324b18). Matter should be understood in terms of 
this role in change, being the patient that undergoes the change. Thus, 
the menstrual fluid, as matter, is the sort of thing that is properly suited 
to become an animal. Not just anything can become an animal. Just as 
you cannot build a house out of just anything, or make an axe out of just 
anything, so also – in fact, to a much greater degree – you cannot make 
an animal out of just anything. An animal of a given species comes 
from the appropriate kind of menstrual fluid acted on by the appro-
priate kind of sperma. Since it is the patient of the change, the change 
happens within the menstrual fluid.11 As long as we take matter to be 
what is suitable for undergoing a change, it does not pose a problem 
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becoming an animal at the end of the change, and so the matter does 
not remain.
If an interpreter is strongly committed to matter remaining 
through change, he or she might suppose that Aristotle must not really 
think that the matter is the menstrual fluid, precisely because it does 
not remain. But that comes at a large cost. What is powerful about 
Aristotle’s account is that it identifies precisely the thing that is suit-
able for undergoing the change, and that is the menstrual fluid. That 
is what has the potentiality to become a fully formed organism (if 
properly acted upon by the sperma), not something else. The search 
for something that remains draws us away from the thing with the 
potential to undergo the change. Aristotle thinks that matter is a prin-
ciple and a cause because it is needed to explain why changes happen; 
thus, it is important that we identify it as the thing with the relevant 
explanatory role: the menstrual fluid. Of course, merely identifying it 
as the menstrual fluid is not enough. If one left it there, Aristotle’s view 
might seem open to the early modern criticism of Aristotelianism that 
it identifies the cause of sleep as ‘dormative virtue’ without explaining 
how wine, for example, accomplishes this effect. But Aristotle does 
discuss in detail in the Generation of Animals how menstrual fluid 
and sperma, together, bring about the formation of an animal (see esp. 
Gen. an. 1.18– 23, 4.1– 3). Identifying menstrual fluid as matter does 
not end the explanation; it identifies what plays a certain explanatory 
role, which then should be investigated in further detail. On Aristotle’s 
account, menstrual fluid and sperma are concocted in the parents’ 
bodies in such a way that, among other things, they have changes in 
their heat and coolness. These are used as tools in the production of 
the offspring.12
Matter’s passivity does not mean that it is dormant or featureless. 
Aristotle thinks the patient in a change plays a crucial role in explaining 
how and why a given change happens in the way that it does. This is 
why Aristotle thinks we must identify the matter in a change if we 
want to understand the change. Sometimes interpreters talk of men-
strual fluid and similar highly developed matter as ‘informed’ matter, 
suggesting that the matter’s development is to be understood in terms 
of the contribution of form rather than that of matter.13 But it is a mis-
take to think that form and matter are opposed to each other in this way. 
It is precisely because the menstrual fluid has these highly developed 
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an animal, and in fact only the right sort of menstrual fluid for a given 
kind of animal. Since the menstrual fluid has a definition, it has a form, 
but this form is not something distinct and added to matter. On the 
contrary, without its form the menstrual fluid would not be suitable 
to undergo the relevant change, and so would not be matter. The men-
strual fluid is in no way dormant or featureless, and if it became so, it 
could no longer be the matter for this change. Aristotelian matter is 
never a generic or featureless stuff; it is always something suitable to 
undergo some specific change or changes.
The menstrual fluid is matter for a substantial change, whereas 
blood, according to Aristotle in the Parts of Animals, is the matter for 
nourishment and growth.14 Nonetheless, it works in fundamentally the 
same way, which is to be expected since nourishment and growth are, 
on Aristotle’s account, types of coming- to- be (Gen. corr. 1.5) and men-
strual fluid is a concocted form of blood (Gen. an. 1.19). When blood 
nourishes bone, there is no reason to think that the blood remains. 
Nonetheless, blood is, precisely speaking, the matter because it is the 
thing suitable to become the parts of the body. The parts of the body are 
sustained by blood insofar as it is blood, just as the animal comes to be 
from the menstrual fluid insofar as it is menstrual fluid.
The Body of an Organism as Matter  
in the DE ANIMA
Next, let us consider the body as the matter of a living organism, which 
is introduced in De anima (On the Soul) 2.1. The soul, for Aristotle, is 
the principle of life, and so it plays an important role not only in his 
work devoted to the soul, but also in works that we would consider bio-
logical: the Generation of Animals and the works known as the Parva 
Naturalia, which discuss phenomena that are ‘common to body and 
soul’. Aristotle thinks that living things are composed of body and soul. 
The body does not have some single change that it is clearly suited to 
undergo, unlike the menstrual fluid. Given this, many scholars have 
suggested that the body is identified as matter because it is what the 
living thing is composed of.15 This relies on a very different criterion 
for something to count as matter, one not directly connected to change. 
I’ll argue here, instead, that the body is matter because it is suitable for 
undergoing the various changes (kinêseis) that are characteristic of the 
living thing. An organism’s body is what undergoes its natural changes, 
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Near the beginning of De anima 2.1, Aristotle declares his view, 
that the soul is substance as form and the body substance as matter, 
and the thing composed of each is also a substance (412a15– 21). He 
then says that the soul is ‘the first actuality of a natural body that has 
life potentially’ (412a27– 28).16 Thus, the matter, namely the body, is 
something that has life potentially. In the next chapter, 2.2, Aristotle 
says that life is ‘said in many ways’; reason, perception, locomotion and 
rest, and change (kinesis) related to nourishment, growth, and decay 
are all forms of life (413a22– 25). Thus, we would expect the body to be 
matter that has the potential for these activities. And this turns out to 
be basically correct.17
The body and soul together compose the living thing; they are, 
respectively, what has the potentiality for life and its first actuality. 
We will examine this notion of potentiality and actuality shortly. First, 
we need to consider the division of labour, according to which some 
features of the organism are due to the soul and others to the body. 
What features of an organism is each responsible for? Aristotle’s view is 
that a soul, insofar as it is a soul, does not change.18 Instead, the changes 
happen in the body, insofar as it is a body. After distinguishing the 
soul’s coincidental changes from the body’s non- coincidental changes 
(406a16– 20), Aristotle says that ‘it is evident that it [the soul] changes 
the body’ (406a30), and that the soul is thereby coincidentally changed 
(406a30– b3). This does not merely apply to locomotion. Living things 
could not digest without the soul, but the soul does not change when we 
digest something; the body does, in virtue of the soul. The body is what 
is receptive of health; health and such things reside in the body, which 
is disposed to receive health (414a4– 14). An animal’s body changes inci-
dentally when it is blown over by a wind, but it changes insofar as it is a 
body when it is changed by the soul. Of course, the organism undergoes 
change when the body does, but it does so insofar as the body changes. 
There is a complicated question of whether the very same types of activ-
ities that are attributed to the whole organism should also be attributed 
to the body.19 But, regardless of how we decide this, a living thing is 
changed in virtue of its body changing; its body is the thing suitable for 
changing. Whenever a living thing undergoes a change, it does so insofar 
as it is a body, i.e. matter. This overall picture fits with Aristotle’s claim 
in 2.1 that the type of body that has a soul is ‘organic’ (412a28– b1). 
As Stephen Menn has argued, to call the body organic (organikon) is 
to say that it is a tool (organon) of the soul, the instrument by which 
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craftsperson is active. Aristotle’s view is that, in fact, the craft itself 
does not change. In a parallel way, the soul does not change insofar as it 
is a soul, whereas the body does.
The next step in understanding Aristotle’s account of the body 
is to understand his claim that the body is a potential being (dunamei 
on, 413a2) and the soul an actuality (entelecheia, energeia).21 Aristotle 
distinguishes between two types of potentiality in the De anima 2.1 
and 2.5. His standard example is that a person who does not know 
something, say mathematics, has a first potentiality for mathematics. 
A  rock, by contrast, does not have this potentiality. Once someone 
learns mathematics, she removes a privation, her ignorance, and now 
possesses a first actuality. This first actuality can at the same time be 
described as a second potentiality. This person has this first actuality/ 
second potentiality even if she is asleep; if she actively thinks about 
some mathematics, e.g. the Pythagorean theorem, this exercise of the 
second potentiality is the second actuality. Aristotle says that the soul 
is a first actuality, which would make the body’s potentiality a first 
potentiality.22 The activity of living is the second actuality, the exercise 
of the soul.
How do we fit together these two ideas about the soul’s rela-
tion to the body:  (1) the soul is what produces changes and the body 
is what is changed, and (2) the soul is first actuality and the body has 
the corresponding first potentiality? While we can reconcile the two 
descriptions of the soul by saying that it does not change (kinein) but 
rather simply becomes active (energeia), that does not explain why the 
very same thing, the body, has these two roles, being what is changed 
and what has the potentiality that corresponds to the soul’s actuality. 
Aristotle thinks that in other cases these roles do not go together: when 
a carpenter exercises her ability, a change happens in the wood, not in 
the carpenter herself, even though she is what has the first potentiality 
for being a carpenter. To explain why these two roles come together in 
the body, consider, as a parallel case, the ability to dance. This ability 
is a first actuality. In order to develop this ability, one needs a first 
potentiality that includes the capacity to move one’s limbs. The ability 
to dance uses this capacity, thereby producing changes in one’s own 
body – not in someone else’s. The soul, for Aristotle, is like the ability 
to dance. An organism’s soul is able to use the organism’s own cap-
acities in specific ways.23 The body is the part of the organism that 
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body’s capacities can only be exercised by the organism that has them. 
Thus, the body has these two roles, both what is changed and what 
has the first potentiality, because its potentiality is for this sort of self- 
reflexive change where an organism changes itself. When my potential 
for being a carpenter is fully realised, I can produce changes in wood, 
whereas when my arm’s potential for moving is fully realised, I  can 
produce changes in my arm. That is the sort of potential my arm, and 
in general, my body has. The body is the matter of this specific sort of 
self- motion.24
It is important not to overextend the analogy between the soul, 
on the one hand, and crafts and abilities, on the other. In particular, 
many people have the first potentiality to dance without having the 
ability to do so. But, according to Aristotle, the body is a potential 
being that cannot exist without the actuality, i.e. the soul. The body 
comes to be with the soul, and when we die or a limb is cut off, this is 
a body or limb in name only, not actually one.25 If you think of matter 
primarily in terms of what remains through a substantial change, this 
raises a puzzle, which J. L. Ackrill develops in a classic article: the body 
does not exist before or after the soul, and so it seems that the matter 
does not remain longer than the form.26 But again, if we think of matter 
as what is suitable to undergo change, rather than as what remains 
through a change, no puzzle arises. When a hand is cut off, what is left 
is not suitable for grasping; it cannot change in the ways characteristic 
of a hand. And when an animal dies, its body is not suitable for living 
in the way characteristic of an animal. It is because of the soul that 
the body is able to change in the way that it does, and so without the 
soul it no longer has the potentiality to change, and hence is a body in 
name only.
On Aristotle’s account, the body can only be understood in terms 
of the activities it engages in, as determined by the soul; the soul needs 
the body to perform these activities. Aristotle brings out this close 
interrelation between body and soul at the end of De anima 2.2, when 
he argues against views that allow any soul to be in any body. This 
would include Plato’s account of reincarnation in the Phaedo, Phaedrus, 
Republic, and Timaeus, where humans can reincarnate into animals. 
Here is how Aristotle puts his view:
For it [the soul] is not a body, but is something belonging to a body; 
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sort – not as our predecessors supposed when they fitted the soul 
into the body without additionally specifying in which body or in 
which sort, even though it appears that whatever happens to show 
up does not receive whatever it happens upon. It happens rather 
in this way, in conformity with reason: the actuality of each thing 
comes about naturally in what has it in potentiality, that is, in its 
appropriate matter.
(Arist. De an. 2.2.414a20– 27)
There is an appropriate type of matter for each type of soul, and this 
is the body for that soul. What makes it appropriate is that it has the 
potentiality that corresponds to a given type of soul. Thus, the body 
has the potentiality of sight, or of hunting down rabbits, or whatever is 
appropriate for the type of living being it is. A wolf’s soul could not be 
in a sheep’s body. What makes a wolf’s body appropriate is precisely that 
it can undergo the changes characteristic of wolves. If it sounds like the 
body and soul are almost two sides of the same coin, that is a welcome 
conclusion for Aristotle. He thinks that once we see that soul relates to 
body as form to matter, we do not need to enquire into the unity of body 
and soul (412b6– 9). Together they form a tightly unified substance.27
When Aristotle says that the body is matter, he is saying that it 
is the right sort of thing to undergo a whole range of changes, those 
characteristic of the organism in question.28 When an animal goes from 
hungry to full, or from here to there, or from tired to awake, it is the 
body, insofar as it is a body, that undergoes this change. This case is 
unlike menstrual fluid, which is properly suited to just one change. 
Nonetheless, the basic account of matter is the same in the De anima 
and in the Generation of Animals. Matter, in general, is what is prop-
erly suited to undergo change. Matter changes insofar as it is matter. 
Different sorts of things undergo different sorts of changes, so there are 
different kinds of matter. The body is matter because the soul produces 
in it a wide range of changes, which together constitute the life of the 
organism. The body can be identified as the matter of an organism 
because an organism is defined in terms of its way of life, and the body 
is the matter for this activity.
The Matter for Elemental Transformation
Last, let us consider the matter involved in the transformation of the 
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are four elements (at least within the sublunary sphere): earth, air, fire, 
and water. He discusses them in a number of places in the corpus, 
in most detail in De caelo (On the Heavens) 3 and 4, Meteorology 4, 
and Generation and Corruption 2. Generation and Corruption 2 is his 
most extensive discussion of their transformation, so we will focus 
on it here. Aristotle clearly is committed to there being matter in this 
transformation, but it is controversial how to understand it. The trad-
itional view is that he is committed to something called ‘prime matter’, 
which is pure potentiality, not actually anything, and which remains 
through the transformation of the elements.29 This is generally treated 
as something that remains through all changes, not simply elemental 
transformation, and which has the potentiality to become anything. It 
is thought of as ‘pure’ matter, as opposed to informed matter, which is 
thought of as matter combined with some form. It is easy to see how 
this notion of matter could naturally lead one to think of matter as 
featureless stuff.
Let me briefly lay out my alternative before providing evidence 
for it. Aristotle thinks that there are several broad types of change; 
one type, substantial change, involves a substance coming- to- be, and 
another type, alteration, involves a change between affections that are 
strict contraries (not mere contradictories). In Aristotle’s natural works, 
he considers the elements substances (e.g. Physics 2.1.192b8– 13 and De 
caelo 3.1298a29– b1), and so, as we would expect, he says that the trans-
formation of one element into another is a type of substantial change 
(Gen. corr. 1.4.319b14– 21).30 I argue that, nonetheless, elemental trans-
formation works the way that alterations work. Although the elements 
do not themselves have contraries (as would be needed for an alter-
ation), they are each essentially characterised by two strict contraries 
from among the pairs: hot/ cold and wet/ dry. Because of this, a change 
between the elements works the same way as an alteration, and so the 
sort of matter involved in the transformation of the elements is the sort 
needed for an alteration. Aristotle argues that in an alteration there is a 
single matter that is able to take on both the contraries, the one at the 
beginning and the one at the end of the change. When changing from 
hot to cold or from wet to dry, there is the same sort of matter at the 
end as there is at the beginning, because the sort of thing suitable for 
becoming hot is exactly the same as the sort suitable for becoming cold. 
Since elemental transformations simply involve changing whether an 
element is hot or cold or whether it is wet or dry, all of the elements 
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should not think that this matter is a pure potentiality to become any-
thing; instead, it is simply a potential to become hot or cold, wet or dry. 
And we should not think that this sort of matter is involved in every 
change; instead, this matter is precisely suited to elemental transform-
ation and so only involved in it and related changes.
Let us turn to the evidence for this interpretation, filling it out in 
the process. Aristotle’s fullest description of this matter is in a very dif-
ficult passage in Generation and Corruption 2.1:
Our own theory is that whereas there is a sort of matter of the 
perceptible things, this is not separable but is always with a 
contrariety, from which the things called ‘elements’ come to 
be. A more precise account of them has been given elsewhere.31 
However, since according to the present approach too [in addition 
to that of the Timaeus, which he has just been discussing] the 
primary bodies are from the matter, we must give an account of 
these too, regarding as a principle and first the matter that on 
the one hand is inseparable but on the other hand underlies the 
contraries (for neither is the hot matter for the cold nor the latter 
for the hot, but the underlying thing is matter for both); so first that 
which is potentially perceptible body is principle, and secondly the 
contrarieties (I mean, for example, heat and cold), and then thirdly 
fire and water and the like. For these change into one another, 
and it is not as Empedocles and others say (for there would be no 
alteration); but the contrarieties do not change.
(Arist. Gen. corr. 2.1.329a24– b3)32
Aristotle is clear at the beginning that there is a matter from which the 
elements come- to- be. (He calls them ‘the things called “elements” ’ in 
order not to endorse that they really are elements. Calling them ‘elem-
ents’ suggests they are the simplest things, but it turns out that they are 
composed of matter and contrarieties.)33 What is this matter for the gen-
eration of the elements? Aristotle says that it ‘underlies the contraries’ 
and that it is ‘perceptible body in potentiality’. In the next chapter he 
identifies the contraries as the essential features that differentiate each 
element from the others, making each the element that it is. An element 
is differentiated by possessing contraries from among the pairs hot/ cold 
and wet/ dry: fire is hot and dry, air is hot and wet, water is cold and wet, 
earth is cold and dry. Aristotle is saying that the matter for the elements 
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In the passage, Aristotle prioritises and contrasts the matter 
with the contrarieties:  ‘so first that which is potentially percep-
tible body [i.e. matter] is principle, and secondly the contrarieties’ 
(329a32– 34). This is connected to the previous clause, where he says 
that the matter underlies the contraries and that it is a principle and 
first. This speaks against the suggestion that Montgomery Furth and 
Mary Louise Gill have developed that a contrary from one pair (e.g. 
hot or cold) can serve as the matter for a transformation between 
the other contraries (e.g. from wet to dry).34 Aristotle here contrasts 
matter with the contraries and prioritises it over them; thus, matter 
cannot be the same as one of them.35 Moreover, the Furth– Gill inter-
pretation runs into a problem with something Aristotle reminds us 
of at the end of the passage:  that the contrarieties do not change. 
This recalls Aristotle’s first argument in Physics 1.6 for needing an 
underlying thing (189a20– 27). Contraries are not the sort of thing to 
undergo change; we need a third thing to change, which he identi-
fies in Physics 1.7 as the matter, with a reference back to this 1.6 
argument (190b23– 33).36 Just as the soul, insofar as it is a soul, does 
not undergo change, so too contraries, insofar as they are contraries, 
do not change. To put it somewhat differently, the contraries them-
selves do not have a potential to undergo change, and that is precisely 
what is required of matter. Furth and Gill’s suggestion is driven by 
the thought that matter must remain through the change. But even 
if we accept this, Aristotle requires matter to do something else:  it 
must be suitable for undergoing a given change. And neither hot nor 
cold is suitable for becoming wet or dry. Again, the focus on finding 
something that remains has drawn interpreters away from identifying 
matter as something with the appropriate potentiality. Furth and Gill 
are explicitly motivated by trying to avoid positing prime matter. My 
account offers another way to do that.
One of Aristotle’s central claims is that this matter that underlies 
the contraries is the same in different elements. In the passage quoted 
above, he says that the underlying thing is the matter for both of the 
contraries. We see a similar thought in Gen. corr. 2.7:37
The sort of thing I mean is that water can come to be from fire, 
and fire from this, since there is something in common, the 
underlying thing.
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Aristotle says that there is an underlying thing in common between fire 
and water. It might seem that this is supposed to follow from the fact 
that water can come from fire. This sort of reading might lead you to 
think that matter always remains through every change, which, in turn, 
would mean that some matter must remain in the case of animal gen-
eration. But note that in the above passage Aristotle is explaining not 
merely why water can come from fire, but also why fire can come from 
water. His explanation for this reciprocal relationship is that they have 
an underlying thing in common. By contrast, while menstrual fluid can 
transform into an animal, an animal cannot transform into menstrual 
fluid.38 The fact that elements have common matter is what explains 
their ability to reciprocally transform, which cannot happen in animal 
generation. Hence, this passage gives us no reason to expect a common 
matter in other types of generation.39
Fire and water have a matter in common because of the specifics 
of how the elements transform into one another. The elements are 
transformed by changing which contraries they have from among the 
pairs hot/ cold and wet/ dry. The matter for the elements is the thing 
that underlies these primary contraries. Normally, for Aristotle a 
change between (strict) contraries is a form of alteration. So it is worth 
considering Aristotle’s account of what underlies in cases of alteration, 
which he discusses in On Generation and Corruption 1.6:
What is more, it is impossible for there to be alteration, or 
segregation and aggregation, unless there is something which acts 
and something which is affected. For, those who posit several 
elements make them come to be by their acting upon and being 
affected by one another, and equally those who make them come 
to be from a single element cannot avoid speaking of action. And 
Diogenes is right to say that if it were not the case that everything 
is from a single thing, there would not be any acting upon or 
being affected by one another, e.g. what is hot being cooled, and 
vice versa – for heat and cold do not change into each other. What 
changes is clearly the underlying thing; so objects between which 
there is action and passion necessarily have a single underlying 
nature. But it is not true to say that everything is of this kind, but 
only those things which affect one another.
(Arist. Gen. corr. 1.6.322b9– 21)
Alteration requires acting and being affected. And when one thing acts 
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thing is affected it becomes like the thing acting on it. He uses as his 
example heat and cold, which, as we have seen, turn out to be differ-
entiae of the elements. A cold thing becomes hotter when a hot thing 
acts on it, and the hot thing in turn becomes colder. Aristotle says that 
there must be the same underlying nature shared between hot and cold 
things in order for them to be able to affect one another. Intuitively, 
this makes sense. The sort of thing that is hot is the same as the sort of 
thing that is cold, and this is why hot and cold things can be affected by 
one another. In general, changes between strict contraries are changes 
between things that share an underlying nature.40 Normally, such a 
change is simply a case of alteration. But in the special case of the 
elements, it is a substantial change between things with the same 
underlying nature, since the elements are substances differentiated by 
strict contraries.41
We can now return and provide a fuller answer to why there is 
not a common nature in the case of the generation of animals. The 
basic reason is that animals are not differentiated by contraries; thus, 
the matter for the creation of an animal is not the matter for a contrary. 
But why not think there is a common nature in all cases, rather than 
only in those between contraries? This is because the right sort of thing 
to become hot is something that has the same nature as the things that 
are hot. But the right sort of thing to become a rabbit is not something 
that has the same nature as the things that are rabbits. Rabbits only 
come from something suitable for becoming a rabbit, and making this 
is a complicated biological process. You cannot just take a rabbit, turn 
it into something else, and then directly make another rabbit out of 
that. By contrast, you can take something that is hot, chill it, and then 
make it hot again. This is why Aristotle says in the first passage quoted 
in this section, from Gen. corr. 2.1, that the matter ‘underlies the con-
traries’, without in any way restricting it to being a matter for becoming 
something new.42
Why should we think of the elements as having a single matter, 
rather than two matters, given that the ability to become hot or cold 
seems independent of the ability to become wet or dry? By the same 
token, one might worry that we should not think of the elements them-
selves as having a unified nature, given that they are defined in terms 
of being hot or cold as well as wet or dry.43 The answer, I  suggest, is 
that Aristotle thinks of these pairs of contraries as two aspects that 
together form a whole. Aristotle argues in Gen. corr. 2.2 that these 
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Something cannot be wet or dry on its own; it must be paired with hot 
or cold. Once we see hot/ cold and wet/ dry as the two basic dimensions 
of being tangible, we can see why Aristotle would think the nature of 
each element is unified – each is tangible in a fundamentally different 
way. The matter of the elements is unified, in turn, as the potentiality 
for being tangible. This is why Aristotle refers to the matter of the elem-
ents, in the Gen. corr. 2.1 passage quoted above, as ‘the matter of per-
ceptible bodies’. This is not an accidental formulation – it is the matter 
of perceptible bodies qua perceptible bodies. The most fundamental 
form of being perceptible is being tangible (Gen. corr. 2.2, De an. 2.2), so 
the matter of perceptible bodies is the matter that is able to take on any 
of the basic ways in which something can be tangible.
We have seen why Aristotle thinks that all four elements have the 
same matter. This means, at a minimum, that there is the same type 
of matter at the beginning of an elemental transformation as there is at 
the end. Does it also mean that the same token matter remains through 
the change? In other words, is the matter at the beginning numerically 
identical with that at the end? Aristotle does not seem to say anything 
one way or another that would directly commit him to its being the 
same token matter.44 In general, he does not seem very concerned with 
such individuation questions in Generation and Corruption, although 
commentators are often extremely interested in this. To the extent that 
Aristotle thinks that only actual substances can be described as ‘a this’ 
(tode ti) and to the extent that what we individuate are this’s, he should 
not think that the matter is the sort of thing that would remain. More 
importantly, even if he does think that it remains, this would not be 
because it is essential to matter that it remain, but rather because of 
some specific feature of the change in question.45 There is nothing about 
his basic notion of matter that requires the matter for the elements to 
remain.
There is one important way in which the matter for the elem-
ents is different from other types of matter. Whereas the menstrual 
fluid and the body have independent, actual features insofar as they 
are matter, the matter of the elements does not seem to have any inde-
pendent, actual features of its own. The menstrual fluid has certain 
actual features that partially ground its potential for reproduction (e.g. 
a certain temperature) and the eagle’s body has certain actual features 
that partially ground its potential to fly (e.g. large wings). By contrast, 
Aristotle does not suggest that the matter of the elements has any 
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to it. Aristotle thinks that each element has actual features and from 
this we can tell that it has potential features. Anything that is hot and 
wet is able to be hot and wet and so also able to be cold and dry. Hot/ 
cold and wet/ dry are the most basic features of being a body, and so 
no other actual features could be metaphysically prior to them. If the 
potential to be hot/ cold and wet/ dry were explained by some prior, 
actual feature, this feature would, in turn, be prior to hot, cold, wet, 
and dry. But that contradicts them being the most basic features, so the 
potential to be hot/ cold or wet/ dry must not be grounded in some prior, 
actual feature. It is a brute potential that the elements have. We can 
refer to each element insofar as it has this potential to be tangible body. 
When we do so, we refer to it as matter.46 This is parallel to the way 
that a living thing undergoes changes insofar as it is a body, i.e. matter. 
But, unlike a body, the matter of the elements has a pure potentiality 
and so to this extent there is something right about the traditional 
notion of prime matter. Unlike other types of matter, the matter of the 
elements has a potentiality that is not grounded in any actuality. But, 
unlike prime matter, the matter of the elements cannot become any-
thing whatsoever, only tangible body. And unlike prime matter, it is 
not crucial that it remain through change.
While interpreters do not typically explain why they actively try 
to avoid the prime matter interpretation, we can see why they would. 
It seems to involve a sort of metaphysically extravagant, magical 
thinking: the idea that there is something that is actually nothing, but 
potentially everything, which remains through every change. The inter-
pretation I’ve offered is not metaphysically extravagant in this way. 
One might think that every ability is grounded – at least in part – in 
some metaphysically prior, actual feature, the way that glass’s ability to 
break is grounded in the actual molecular structure of glass. But it is not 
clear that every ability is grounded in this way. My suggestion is that 
Aristotle thinks that the elements’ potential to be a perceptible body 
is not due to some prior, actual feature of the elements. Contemporary 
physics suggests that the ability to be hot/ cold and wet/ dry is at least 
partially due to more basic molecular features. But it is not clear that 
in contemporary physics every potentiality must be grounded in prior 
actual features. For example, is there some actual feature of electrons 
that gives them the potential to move from one atom to another? Or 
is this a brute potentiality that electrons have, not grounded in some 
prior actual feature? If we supposed that this is a brute fact about them, 
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Similarly, the matter of the elements, according to Aristotle, has a brute 
potentiality, an ability to be any of the four basic types of tangible body, 
and this is not grounded in some more basic feature that they have. 
There is nothing spooky about this.47
Conclusion
Aristotle thinks that a fundamental feature of the natural world is 
that the things in it change. Thus, if we want to understand things 
in the natural world, we need to understand their changes. In order 
to understand a change, we need to grasp what is suitable to undergo 
this change. To grasp something in this way is to consider it as 
matter. Given that different things are suitable for different types of 
changes, there will be different types of matter, and the features of 
these types of matter will differ depending on the change in question. 
An animal’s menstrual fluid is very different from its body, which is 
very different from fire and water insofar as they can become cold or 
dry. Nonetheless, Aristotle’s notion of matter is fundamentally the 
same across a variety of scientific contexts: it is a thing insofar as it is 
able to undergo a given change. Examining Aristotle’s scientific works 
helps us understand how he thinks of different sorts of matter, that 
is, how he thinks about the things suitable for undergoing different 
natural changes.
Notes
I’d like to thank Andreas Anagnostopoulos, Emily Fletcher, Chris Frey, Monte 
Johnson, Sean Kelsey, Mary Krizan, Anna Schriefl, and Liba Taub, for their helpful 
comments on drafts, as well as the participants at the 2016 Oxford Workshop on 
Matter.
 1 Only the De anima (On the Soul) is controversial. Shields 2016, for example, 
has recently argued that some parts of the work should be considered first phil-
osophy (i.e. metaphysics) rather than natural philosophy. The parts I discuss here 
are uncontroversially natural philosophy.
 2 For an introduction to interesting issues in Aristotle’s biology, I  suggest 
Gotthelf 2012a.
 3 This chapter focuses on Aristotle’s natural philosophy, occasionally referring to 
his Metaphysics but without relying on this work. It is often difficult to determine 
the dialectical structure of the Metaphysics, and there are questions about how 
to understand it as a science distinct from natural philosophy. My approach here 
is to provide an account of matter in the natural works, taken on their own; we 
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I think we should keep open the possibility that Aristotle operates with a broader 
notion of matter in parts of the Metaphysics than he does in his natural works.
 4 In Generation and Corruption, Aristotle says that ‘what is most strictly matter 
is the substratum receptive of generation and corruption; but, in a way, so is 
that of other changes, since all substrata are receptive of contrarieties of one sort 
or another’ (320a2– 5, Williams trans.). Cf., Metaph. 7.1.1042a32– 1042b3, and 
11.2.1069b9– 20. Just as Aristotle is frequently interested in power (dunamis) not 
merely in the ‘most strict’ (malista kuriôs) sense (cf. Metaph. 8.1), so also he 
is frequently interested in matter not merely in the most strict sense. Aristotle 
discusses the matter of place (which is what allows the stars to move) in Metaph. 
7.1.1042a32– 1042b6, 7.4.1044b6– 8; 8.8.1050b20– 24, 11.2.1069b24– 26.
 5 The first article was King 1956. The debate was at its most intense in the 1970s. 
For recent discussions, see Krizan 2013 (with useful bibliography) and Henry 
2015, 2019.
 6 Ultimately, I think this notion is deployed throughout Aristotle’s natural philo-
sophical works, but here I limit my claims to these three treatises. It would be 
interesting if there are exceptions, given the broad coherence of his notion across 
his natural philosophy.
 7 I argue that this is the notion of matter in Physics 1 in Ebrey 2007 and Ebrey 
unpublished.
 8 The classic defence of this view is Lennox 1987.
 9 For a classic statement of this problem, see Charlton 1970, 76– 7.
 10 I argue for this at length in Ebrey 2007 and Ebrey unpublished Henry (2015, 2019) 
also closely considers Physics 1 and Generation and Corruption 1 and argues that 
matter need not remain through change.
 11 This is argued for in Gelber 2010. See Physics 3.3 for the general view that changes 
happen within the patient.
 12 For a complementary account, which discusses the role of these motions at much 
more length, see Gelber 2010, especially section 6.
 13 For a classic statement, see Peck 1942, xii– xiii.
 14 For a discussion of blood as matter in the Parts of Animals, see Ebrey 2015.
 15 E.g. Charlton 1970 (esp. 73); Ackrill 1972/ 3; Shields 2016 (esp. xvii– xxviii).
 16 All De anima translations from Shields 2016.
 17 The exception is reason (nous). See note 28.
 18 This is emphasised in De anima 1.3– I.5; see especially 406a2, 408b30– 31, 411a24– 
26. For a general discussion of the importance of this for Aristotle’s conception of 
the soul, see Menn 2002.
 19 Those who think that strictly the organism engages in its characteristic activ-
ities, but not the body, include Barnes 1971/ 2, 103 and Menn 2002, 100– 1. Before 
discussing the textual support for this, suppose it is correct. If so, then (as Menn 
says) these activities would happen in virtue of changes within the body (except 
in cases of pure contemplation). The parallel with the craftsman is instructive. 
When a builder builds a house her hammer changes, and not coincidentally. At 
the same time, the builder builds the house, not her tools. This is because the 
builder is the unchanging efficient cause of the change (cf., 416a34– b3). The 
builder’s body changes because of her soul; thereby, the whole builder changes. 
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form and efficient cause, as well as its body, as matter. The main passage cited 
for thinking the whole organism engages in its activities, not the body, is in De 
an. 1.4 (408b11– 16). Note that Aristotle does not mention the body here at all; he 
simply says that it is better to say that the human pities or learns or thinks than 
that the soul does. For a thoughtful discussion of what we can conclude from this 
passage, see Lorenz 2007, 215– 19.
 20 Menn 2002, 108– 12.
 21 It is very tricky to translate these terms. Dunamis is sometimes translated ‘cap-
acity’, sometimes ‘ability’, sometimes ‘potentiality’. I have chosen the traditional 
‘potentiality’ here because it seems to bridge cases that we would call a capacity, 
those we would call an ability, and those that seem broader than a single ability. 
The downside is that this term seems more abstract and theoretical, whereas the 
word itself is ordinary Greek. I  take Aristotle to use entelecheia and energeia 
interchangeably in the De anima 2.1 and 2.5 (e.g. 412a26– 27), although they may 
have slightly different emphases. Sometimes they refer to activities or changes, at 
other times to things that are not changing. I have translated them as ‘actuality’, 
although this downplays their connection to change. See Beere 2009, 3– 5, 169– 219 
for a clear discussion of these issues and a proposal for how Aristotle understands 
the single notion of being energeia in Metaphysics Theta.
 22 Pace Whiting 1992, 88– 9, who takes the body to be a potentiality for the second 
actuality, which would make the body a first actuality.
 23 In my view, the soul relates to the body in this self- reflexive way because 
organisms are natural things, and these have their principle of movement and rest 
inside of themselves (Physics 2.1.192b20– 23), whereas artificial things, such as 
the products of carpentry, do not.
 24 For a related idea, very briefly expressed, see Frede 1992, 104. Lorenz 2007, 
esp. 211– 19, develops the idea that in sense perception the soul undergoes the 
change from first to second actuality while the sense organ undergoes an ordinary 
change, altering the organ.
 25 E.g. Gen. corr 1.5.321b29– 32; Mete. 4.12.390a10– 12; De an. 2.1.412b19– 26; Part. 
an. 1.1.640b34– 641a34; Gen. an. 2.1.734b24– 27. For a general discussion of this 
‘homonymy principle’ and its relevance to Aristotle’s notion of a body, see Frey 
2007, especially section 2.
 26 Ackrill 1972/ 3.
 27 Frey 2015a, esp. 19, argues for a stronger form of unity, which is compatible with 
the one suggested here.
 28 There is one exceptions to this, or perhaps two. First, Aristotle thinks that there is 
no bodily organ for the exercise of reason, although he seems to think that every 
exercise of reason involves an exercise of imagination, which does have a bodily 
organ. Second, it is controversial whether the body changes when we perceive. 
Burnyeat 1992 provocatively claims that there is no physiological change when 
we perceive. For a recent survey and proposed resolution, see Caston 2005, and for 
another account, Lorenz 2007. The current scholarly consensus, which I share, is 
that there is some sort of physiological change in the sense organ, although the 
exact nature of this is disputed.
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 30 Famously, in Metaphysics 6.16 (1040b5– 10), Aristotle denies that the elements 
are genuine substances. But elsewhere in the Metaphysics, he says that they 
are substances (Metaph. 4.8.1017b10– 14, 6.2.1028b8– 13, 7.1.1042a6– 12). More 
importantly, I  see no evidence for such doubt in Aristotle’s natural philosophy 
(pace Gill 2009). He routinely puts them in his lists of substances, and treats them 
as such. Moreover, change between elements is one of his two examples of sub-
stantial change in a chapter on this topic, Gen. corr. 1.4 (319b14– 21). In my view, 
Aristotle uses a higher standard for being a substance in Metaphysics 6.16 than he 
requires in his natural philosophy. This said, my account can be accepted even if 
(like Gill 2009) one does not accept that the elements are genuine substances in 
Aristotle’s natural works.
 31 It is controversial what ‘from which’ refers back to in the first sentence, and what 
‘them’ and ‘elsewhere’ refer to in the second sentence. For my purposes this does 
not matter. For a discussion of the issues, and alternative accounts, see Williams 
1982, 154– 6; Gill 1989, 244– 5; Broadie 2004, 140– 2.
 32 My translation of this passage draws primarily from Broadie 2004, 140, as well as 
Williams 1982 ad loc. and Gill 1989, 244. Other translations of the Gen. corr. are 
from Williams 1982, lightly modified.
 33 Crowley 2008 argues that we should not translate the phrase ‘so- called elem-
ents’. I  agree as a matter of translation, but think that nonetheless Aristotle’s 
considered view is that strictly they are not elements. Cf., Timaeus 48b– c, where 
Timaeus similarly denies that the things called elements really are such. I take 
Aristotle in this passage to use ‘contrary’ and ‘contrariety’ interchangeably.
 34 Furth 1988, 221– 7; Gill 1989, ch. 2 and appendix. Krizan 2013 distinguishes 
between a matter that the element is composed of, and a distinct matter that 
remains through the change. The latter, which she calls the ‘material constituent’, 
functions the way that matter does for Furth and Gill. She offers no direct evidence 
that Aristotle thinks that there are these two sorts of matter. The account I offer 
here resolves Krizan’s puzzles without positing these two different types of matter.
 35 Gill 1989, 245, suggests that Aristotle means that in a given change, one con-
trary (e.g. hot) will be matter, which is the prior principle, and contraries from 
the other spectrum (e.g. wet and dry) will be the ‘contraries’ that are the second 
principles. Certainly, the natural reading of the passage is that the matter is dis-
tinct from any contraries, and that it underlies them. Aristotle never says that 
he is restricting his claims to only one pair of contraries. Moreover, he identifies 
matter simply as ‘perceptible body in potentiality’. What counts as ‘perceptible 
body in potentiality’ should not change depending on whether a change happens 
in the hot– cold spectrum or the wet– dry spectrum; thus, the matter should be the 
same in both cases. Below I discuss why Aristotle calls this matter ‘perceptible 
body in potentiality’.
 36 Gill 1989 says, ‘If for Aristotle the hot and the cold were not the sorts of entity 
that could serve as the matter for something, his statement is bizarre’ (245). To 
the contrary, his point in Physics 1.6 (repeated in 1.7) is precisely that contraries, 
in general, cannot undergo change, which is why we need matter.
 37 See also Gen. corr. 2.5.332a17– 18, where the term ‘matter’ is used. Aristotle moves 
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thing in Generation and Corruption, just as he does in Physics 1. Sometimes he 
uses ‘underlying thing’ as a broader term that encompasses more than just matter.
 38 Of course, adult female animals sometimes produce menstrual fluid, but such 
animals are not transformed as a whole in this process.
 39 Williams 1982’s appendix on prime matter defends the traditional prime matter 
view by arguing against its opponents. His best evidence is the passages I have 
cited above where Aristotle notes that we have the same matter, or underlying 
thing, for contraries. But that does not give us evidence for thinking that this 
matter is all things potentially, or that it is involved in non- elemental changes. 
Moreover, I argue below that there is no reason to think that this matter for elem-
ental transformations remains through this change, as opposed to there being a 
new matter of the same type at the end of the change.
 40 This also fits very naturally with Aristotle’s account in Gen. corr. 1.7, according 
to which all agents and patients share a genus; this gives them a common nature 
that allows them to affect one another.
 41 Note also that this account allows for a natural reading of Aristotle’s claim in 
Gen. corr. 2.4 (331b4) that it is possible to transform from one element to the dia-
metrically opposed element – the one that it shares no contraries with. Aristotle 
says that this transformation takes longer because it simultaneously changes 
both contraries. Furth, Gill, Krizan, and those with similar views are forced to 
argue that the process happens by first changing one of the contraries and then 
the other. But that is not what Aristotle says, and such interpreters have to try 
to explain why we should think of this as one difficult change, rather than two 
ordinary changes. On my account, each element has matter that allows it to 
become hot– cold and wet– dry. Given this, something could change both of these 
simultaneously, turning into the diametrically opposed element, but (Aristotle is 
claiming) that would be harder, because it is harder to change two things at once, 
rather than one.
 42 While Broadie 2004 does not identify the matter for the elements in the way 
that I do, in several ways her account is similar to the one presented here. One 
important difference is that she argues that each element only has a matter for 
becoming the other elements, which she thinks in no way underlies the form of 
the element (see esp. 146– 50).
 43 Krizan 2013 usefully pushes the question of how the elements are unified in the 
way needed for them to be substances. She addresses the problem by arguing that 
one of the pair hot/ cold or wet/ dry serves the form of an element, and the other 
as the matter. While this solves the problem of not having two forms (e.g. both 
cold and wet), it does not seem to be sufficient to unify matter and form. In gen-
eral, Aristotle’s solution to this is to view matter as potentially what form is 
actually (cf. De an. 2.1, Metaph. 7.6), and it is not clear how Krizan’s account 
accomplishes this.
 44 There is a tricky question of whether Gen. corr.1.4.319b8– 18 requires that matter 
not remain through a substantial change. Broadie 2004 argues that this passage 
requires that it not remain. If she were right, then there would have to be a new 
matter at the end of the change of the same kind as the one there beforehand. 
However, I do not think that the passage requires this. In it Aristotle distinguishes 
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that since the change is in the underlying thing, not an affection, we must think 
that the entire underlying thing is ‘exchanged’ (Broadie 2004, 124). But why not 
think that it is possible that part of the underlying thing stays the same while 
another part changes? Why must it be exchanged as a whole? In particular, how 
should we understand it if a substance’s differentia changes? That is what happens 
in the case of the transformation of the elements, e.g. hot is replaced with cold. 
Given that changing a differentia leads to a substantial change, it seems that such 
a change should count as the underlying thing changing, not an affection. Thus, 
this passage is compatible with thinking that part of the underlying thing remains, 
namely the matter, while another part is ‘exchanged’, namely the differentia.
 45 In Generation and Corruption 1.4, Aristotle seems to allow that numerically the 
same affection could remain through a generation, so that when water comes to 
be from air, the very same transparency could remain from the water to the air 
(319b21– 24). If this is his view, perhaps he would also be happy to think that the 
very same matter could remain through the change, but then this would not be a 
special feature of matter.
 46 In general, I have argued in this chapter that matter undergoes change insofar as it 
is matter. Here I am making a slightly different claim: that something (in this case 
the elements) is matter insofar as it undergoes a change. The point is that matter 
is what (properly speaking) undergoes any given change, just as the efficient cause 
is what (properly speaking) produces any given change. The elements can undergo 
a transformation into one another and Aristotle thinks there must be something 
in virtue of which they are able to do so. Given this, the elements must be able 
to be considered as matter, since they can undergo change and it is precisely in 
virtue of being matter that something can do this.
 47 Vetter 2015 defends a stronger claim in contemporary metaphysics, that potenti-
ality is a ‘primitive or basic notion’ that is not reduced to anything else (see, e.g., 
the introduction, 2– 3). I am only claiming that it is reasonable to think of the 
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